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Abstract: Jordan faces great internal water scarcity and pollution, conflict over  
trans-boundary waters, and strong dependency on external water resources through trade. 
This paper analyzes these issues and subsequently reviews options to reduce the risk of 
extreme water scarcity and dependency. Based on estimates of water footprint, water 
availability, and virtual water trade, we find that groundwater consumption is nearly 
double the groundwater availability, water pollution aggravates blue water scarcity, and 
Jordan’s external virtual water import dependency is 86%. The review of response options 
yields 10 ingredients for a strategy for Jordan to mitigate the risks of extreme water 
scarcity and dependency. With respect to these ingredients, Jordan’s current water policy 
requires a strong redirection towards water demand management. Actual implementation 
of the plans in the national water strategy (against existing oppositions) would be a first 
step. However, more attention should be paid to reducing water demand by changing the 
consumption pattern of Jordanian consumers. Moreover, unsustainable exploitation of the 
fossil Disi aquifer should soon be halted and planned desalination projects require careful 
consideration regarding the sustainability of their energy supply. 
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1. Introduction 
The water situation in Jordan is complex and unsustainable. Jordan experiences growing freshwater 
demands that already exceed availability and surface and groundwater resources are polluted [1–7].  
At the same time, Jordan heavily relies on water resources outside its borders, in the physical sense 
through the sharing of rivers and aquifers with neighboring countries as well as indirectly through 
Jordan’s strong dependence on virtual water imports [8]. Sharing water resources with Israel and Syria 
has led to tensions in the past [9–12]. On top of this, Jordan has experienced large influxes of refugees 
as a result of the ongoing conflicts in the surrounding countries [12,13], which increases Jordan’s 
struggle to meet domestic water needs [1,2,4–6,14,15]. 
Jordan is partly arid and partly semi-arid [5,6,16,17] and therefore has naturally low water 
availability. Climate change has caused a decline in precipitation and hence surface water flows [4,6]. 
Based on model simulations for different climate change scenarios, Abdulla et al. [18] found that 
decreases in precipitation will lead to significant decreases in runoff and groundwater recharge in the 
Zarqa river basin (Figure 1). The percentage of time that the Jordan River basin and its surroundings 
will experience moderate, severe, and extreme drought conditions is expected to increase in the future [16]. 
Such droughts can have devastating effects when the agricultural and water management practices in 
place are unsustainable [19]. Furthermore, the (semi-)arid conditions in the Jordan Valley, 
characterized by a combination of high potential evapotranspiration and low precipitation, causes a 
lack of salt flushing and leaching of agricultural soils, leading to alarming soil salinity levels [20]. 
Naturally low water availability in Jordan is reduced further by (over)consumption of shared surface 
water resources by upstream and neighboring countries. Both the Jordan River and the Yarmouk River 
have been depleted by upstream (over)consumption in Israel and Syria [2,4,6,21]. The sharing of  
trans-boundary water resources has led to difficulties and tensions. In 1994, Jordan and Israel signed a 
peace treaty that included agreements on water allocations [22]. Jordan is allowed a certain outflow 
from Lake Tiberius (situated in Israel) into the Lower Jordan River. The current national water strategy 
of Jordan assumes 50 × 106 m³/year of water to be secured by the peace treaty [23]. When in 1999 the 
region was struck by a drought event, the agreed water allocation was threatened and bilateral talks 
temporarily broke down before the two parties found a resolution in the end [9,10]. With minimal 
outflow from Lake Tiberius controlled by Israel, the Lower Jordan River mainly depends on inflow 
from its main tributary, the Yarmouk River [3]. The Yarmouk River is shared by Jordan, Syria, and 
Israel [24]. Jordan and Syria signed an agreement on sharing the Yarmouk’s water in 1987 [11,24]. 
Nevertheless, the countries have had continued tensions over the construction and operation of Syrian 
dams on the river [12]. In 2012, The Jordan Times [11] reported that Syria violated the agreement, 
thereby depriving Jordan of its legitimate water share. 
Current water demand in Jordan exceeds the limited renewable water resources available in the 
country. Agricultural water demand is growing (by 38% in the period 2000–2010 [4]) despite efforts to 
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improve irrigation efficiency and encouraging farmers to grow less water-intensive crops [1]. 
Domestic water demand is unmet and still increasing (by 40%–46% in the period 2000–2010 [4,6]). 
This increase is due to rapid population growth, caused by a high rate of natural population growth and 
periodic massive influxes of refugees [1,2,5,6,15]. In 2014, the refugee population in Jordan, mostly 
consisting of Syrians, was around 10% of the country’s total population (Figure 2). These are officially 
registered refugees only and the actual number is likely to be higher. Since the conflicts in Syria, Iraq, 
and Israel/Palestine are ongoing, there is every reason to believe that the number of people seeking 
refuge in Jordan is growing. 
Overconsumption of Jordan’s surface and groundwater resources is associated with several 
environmental impacts. Due to the high amount of abstractions along its course, the Jordan River has 
shrunk to a small creek by the time it reaches the Dead Sea, with current discharge being less than 5% 
of historical levels [6,7]. This has led to an alarming decline of the Dead Sea level, which in turn 
causes lowering of groundwater tables in adjacent aquifers [4]. Since the 1970s, the water level of the 
Dead Sea has dropped at a rate of about 1 meter per year [25,26]. With each meter of reduction,  
300 × 106 m³ of fresh water is lost from neighboring aquifers [25]. Groundwater levels are rapidly 
dropping throughout the country [1,2,5]. This has led to the drying up of springs and disappearance of 
the Azraq wetlands [3], with reduced habitat for endemic species and migratory birds as a consequence [1]. 
Problems of surface and groundwater pollution are widespread in Jordan, which aggravates water 
scarcity [27]. Inadequate treatment of industrial and domestic wastewater and over- and misuse of 
fertilizers and pesticides pollute these resources [1,6,28]. The canals that distribute water throughout 
Jordan are more and more polluted by salts and other agricultural runoff [4]. Pollution of groundwater 
is exacerbated by overpumping, which leads to a concentration of salts and other pollutants [1,17,29–32]. 
Hotspots of groundwater pollution in the regions of Amman, Zarqa, and Balqa have been mapped by 
Alqadi et al. [33]. The pollution of water in Jordan is also partially a trans-boundary issue. The Jordan 
River Basin suffers from agricultural runoff and untreated wastewater from all riparian countries [1]. 
Jordan thus faces great internal water scarcity and pollution, conflict over trans-boundary waters, 
and strong dependency on external water resources through trade. Given the great variety of 
challenges, sustainable water management in Jordan is a challenging task, which thus far has not 
succeeded. The objective of this paper is to analyze Jordan’s domestic water scarcity and pollution and 
the country’s external water dependency, and subsequently review options to reduce the risk of 
extreme water scarcity and dependency. In the next section we discuss methods and data. In the third 
section we analyze the water situation in Jordan from a water footprint perspective, with the aim of 
accurately quantifying the severity of water scarcity and pollution in Jordan. In the fourth section, we 
analyze the country’s dependency on external water resources by quantifying and mapping the world-wide 
water consumption associated with the products and commodities Jordanians consume. In the fifth 
section, we review possible responses to Jordan’s water problems and external water dependency. 
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Figure 1. Map of Jordan with surface water basins and rainfall isohyets. Source: [34]. 
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Figure 2. Refugees and asylum seekers in Jordan. Data: total population from [35]; refugee 
and asylum seekers population from [36]. 
2. Methods and Data 
We estimate water footprints of production and consumption and virtual water trade following the 
global standard for Water Footprint Assessment [37]. We quantify the water footprint (WF) of five 
different sectors in Jordan: crop production, grazing, animal water supply, industrial production, and 
domestic water supply. Therein we distinguish three different WFs: green, blue, and gray. The green 
WF refers to the appropriation of the green water flow (i.e., evapotranspiration of precipitation stored 
in the soil moisture and on top of vegetation) in crop production and grazing systems. The blue WF 
expresses the consumptive use of surface and groundwater (blue water resources), which excludes 
return flows to these resources. The gray WF expresses water pollution in the same unit as water 
consumption. It measures the volume of freshwater required to dilute the pollutants that enter blue 
water resources to such an extent that ambient water quality standards are not violated. 
We estimate the WF of crops in Jordan for the period 1996–2005 following the method of and using 
the same underlying datasets as Mekonnen and Hoekstra [38]. The gray WF of crop production is 
calculated based on leaching of nitrogen to the groundwater, assuming an ambient water quality 
standard of 10 mg/L of nitrate–nitrogen (NO3–N). The WF of grazing and the domestic and industrial 
sectors as well as imported and exported virtual water volumes are estimated following the methods of 
Hoekstra and Mekonnen [8]. The gray WFs of the industrial and domestic sectors relate to the 
aggregate of pollutants, but are conservative estimates since we take the part of the return flow which 
is disposed into the environment without prior treatment as a measure of the gray WF (thus assuming a 
dilution factor of 1), following Hoekstra and Mekonnen [8]. 
The WF of Jordan’s consumption, defined as the volume of water consumed to produce all the 
products consumed by the Jordanian population, inside and outside Jordan, is calculated following 
Hoekstra and Mekonnen [8]. The national water saving through trade is the volume of water that 
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Jordan saved by importing products instead of producing them domestically, and is calculated 
following Mekonnen and Hoekstra [39]. 
The total blue WF of each sector is split into a part originating from surface water (i.e., blue 
surface-WF) and a part originating from groundwater (i.e., blue ground-WF). This was done according 
to the origin of blue water use per sector (groundwater versus surface water) which we obtained from 
Alqadi and Kumar [4]. We scaled the estimated ground-WFs of industries and households to equal 
water withdrawals based on the consumptive use fraction following Schyns and Hoekstra [40].  
The underlying assumption is that none of the water abstracted from groundwater for industrial 
production and domestic water supply returns (clean) to the groundwater in the same period of time. 
Blue water scarcity is calculated as the ratio of the total blue WF in Jordan over total blue water 
availability [37]. Total blue water availability is defined as the total renewable surface and 
groundwater resources, as defined by the FAO [41]. We assess blue water scarcity for the sum of 
surface and groundwater, but also for groundwater separately. Jordan’s renewable surface water 
resources are estimated by taking the sum of treaty allocations and surface run-off produced internally. 
Groundwater availability is defined as the groundwater recharge minus the fraction of natural 
groundwater outflow required to sustain environmental flow requirements in the river [37]. In practice, 
groundwater availability in Jordan is often reported as the “safe yield” of groundwater without further 
clarification [2,6,23,30,42]. The FAO [41] defines “safe yield” as the amount of water (in general, the 
long-term average amount) that can be withdrawn from the groundwater without causing undesirable 
results. Although it is a vague concept [43,44], we take reported figures on safe yield [2,6,23,30,42] as 
a proxy for groundwater availability, due to lack of data. We consider Jordan’s blue water availability 
around the year 2000 as proper context for the WF estimates that relate to the period 1996–2005.  
We use the water scarcity classification by Schyns and Hoekstra [40], which is derived from that of 
Hoekstra et al. [45] but compensated for the fact that environmental flow requirements are not 
considered by using stricter threshold values for the different scarcity levels. A blue water scarcity 
level beyond 0.4 is classified as severe water scarcity and indicates that the blue WF exceeds 40% of 
the maximum sustainable blue WF. Levels in the ranges 0.3–0.4, 0.2–0.3, and <0.2 are classified as 
significant, moderate, and low blue water scarcity, respectively. 
The water pollution level is calculated as the ratio of the actual to the maximum sustainable gray 
WF [37]. The maximum sustainable gray WF, an indicator of the assimilation capacity for water 
pollution, equals the actual runoff, which is estimated as natural runoff minus the blue water 
consumed. The water pollution level thus measures the degree to which the waste assimilation capacity 
of blue water resources has been consumed. A water pollution level above 100% means that the gray 
WF exceeds the sustainable level, thus ambient water quality standards are violated. 
Finally, we review the sustainability of proposed solutions to Jordan’s domestic water problems and 
external water dependency in literature, while involving the results from the analysis in this paper.  
We categorize the response options into five categories, which we use to position current water policy 
in Jordan. These categories are: (1) increasing water availability; (2) reducing water demand per unit 
of product; (3) reducing water demand by changing production and consumption patterns; (4) reducing 
risks related to the external water dependency; and (5) international assistance in taking in refugees. 
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3. The Unsustainability of Water Consumption and Pollution in Jordan 
3.1. The Water Footprint of Activities in Jordan 
The total WF in Jordan in the period 1996–2005 was 1446 × 106 m³/year (53% green; 31% blue;  
16% gray) (Table 1). The productive use of green water in crop production and grazing systems 
accounts for the largest share in the total. Unsurprisingly, the largest blue WF is related to irrigated 
agriculture. Forty-five per cent of all water consumed (green plus blue) in crop production is blue, 
showing the high dependency of Jordanian agriculture on irrigation water. Blue water use is 
predominant in the Jordan Valley and the desert areas, while green water use is predominant in the 
Highlands [15]. Water consumption in the domestic and industrial sectors constitutes only about 7% of 
all blue water consumed in Jordan. The gray WF in these sectors is 5.6 times their blue water 
consumption, due to poor wastewater treatment. 
Table 1. Water footprint of activities in Jordan (106 m3/year). Period: 1996–2005. 
Activity 
Green 
Water 
Footprint 1 
Blue 
Groundwater 
Footprint 2 
Blue Surface 
Water 
Footprint 2 
Total Blue 
Water 
Footprint 1,3 
Gray Water 
Footprint 1 
Total 
Water 
Footprint 
Crop production 493 263 143 406 54.3 953 
Grazing 277   277 
Animal water supply 1.4 9.9 11.3 11.3 
Industrial production 36.5 0.1 1.9 17.5 19.4 
Domestic water supply 232 5.9 29.1 155 185 
Total 770 533 159 449 227 1446 
Notes: 1 Calculated following [8,38]; 2 Blue groundwater versus surface water footprint based on total blue 
water footprint and [4]; 3 Total blue water footprint is not equal to the sum of blue surface and groundwater 
footprint, because the blue groundwater footprints of industrial production and domestic water supply equal 
water abstraction instead of consumptive use only (Section 2). 
The WF figures relate to water consumption (net water abstraction) as opposed to water withdrawal 
(gross water abstraction) and therefore exclude return flows to the natural system. This explains the 
difference between the WF estimates in Table 1 and the figures on water use distribution over the 
different sectors reported by Hadadin et al. [6] and Alqadi and Kumar [4] that indicate that around 
35% of all blue water is used in the industrial and domestic sectors. 
Part of the WF in Jordan is related to the production of crops and products for export. Total virtual 
water export from Jordan in the period 1996–2005 was around 1046 × 106 m³/year (Table 2). This is 
nearly three-quarters of the WF in Jordan (Table 1), but it also includes the virtual water related to the 
re-export of imported products. The largest virtual water export volumes are related to cotton-based 
products, animal products, and industrial products. However, since cotton is not grown in Jordan, the 
virtual water export associated with seed cotton is due to the re-export of imported cotton that has been 
processed in Jordan’s textile industry. This means that the virtual water export from Jordanian water 
resources is mainly related to the export of animal and industrial products, whereby the latter is largely 
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related to pollution (gray WF). Large volumes of Jordanian blue water resources (i.e., surface and 
groundwater) are also exported in the form of tomatoes, wheat, and olives. 
Table 2. Jordan’s virtual water export (VWE) by product category (106 m³/year). Period: 
1996–2005. Data based on [8]. 
Product Green VWE Blue VWE Gray VWE Total VWE % of Total 
Seed cotton 270 149 53.8 473 45% 
Animal products 228 49.8 20.7 298 29% 
Industrial products 0.0 6.8 115 121 12% 
Tomatoes 5.9 11.9 0.0 17.7 2% 
Wheat 11.5 5.0 0.9 17.4 2% 
Olives 7.3 4.6 1.5 13.4 1% 
Oil palm fruit 8.3 0.0 0.3 8.6 1% 
Artichokes 3.8 2.9 0.0 6.7 1% 
Papayas 5.4 0.5 0.3 6.3 1% 
Other crops 51.7 26.3 5.4 83.4 8% 
Total export 592 256 198 1046 100% 
3.2. Blue Water Scarcity: Actual versus Maximum Sustainable Blue Water Footprint 
Precipitation over Jordan is highly variable in space and time [2,16,46]. According to Mohsen [2], 
precipitation varies from 6000 to 11,500 million m³/year. The rainy season stretches from 
October/November to April/May, with 80% of precipitation occurring in the period from December to 
March and practically zero outside the rainy season [16,32,46]. The northwest of Jordan is semi-arid, 
receiving 200–600 mm/year of precipitation. Much of the eastern and southern part of the country, 
constituting about 80%–90% of Jordan’s surface area, is classified as arid and receives only 50–100 mm 
or less of precipitation each year [2,3,6,16,46]. Groundwater availability is assumed to be equal to the 
“safe yield” from renewable groundwater resources (see Section 2), which is approximately  
277 × 106 m³/year [2,6,23,30,42]. We estimate Jordan’s renewable surface water resources in the 
period 1996–2005 at 373 × 106 m³/year by taking the sum of treaty allocations (220 × 106 m³/year) and 
flow from wadis in the Jordan River Valley (153 × 106 m³/year) in the year 2000 according to  
Hadadin et al. [6]. Total renewable water resources (surface and groundwater) are therefore estimated 
in this study at 650 × 106 m³/year. This is slightly lower than the 671 × 106 m³/year of renewable blue 
water in 2000 as estimated by Van Aken et al. [3] and slightly higher than the sum of developed 
surface water resources, flow secured by the peace treaty with Israel, and safe yield from groundwater 
as reported for the year 2007 in Jordan’s national water strategy [23], namely 620 × 106 m³/year.  
Due to Jordan’s high dependency on water from upstream and neighboring countries, total blue water 
availability in Jordan is not purely natural runoff. Rather, it is actual inflow into Jordan from upstream 
countries (natural inflow minus what has been consumed through upstream WFs) plus naturally 
generated runoff from precipitation over Jordan. 
When comparing the blue WF to blue water availability, we find that, overall, Jordan is severely 
water scarce (water scarcity ratio >0.40), and that groundwater is overexploited (water scarcity  
ratio >1) (Table 3). The groundwater scarcity index indicates that the blue ground-WF in Jordan is 
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nearly double the groundwater availability. Other quantitative estimates of the country-average ratio of 
groundwater withdrawal over safe yield range from 1.6 [30] to 1.9 [2,4]. Although other studies have 
also described water scarcity in Jordan as severe, our estimate is even more alarming, since we have 
looked at water consumption (excluding return flows) rather than withdrawals. 
Table 3. Blue water scarcity in Jordan regarding total runoff and groundwater only. 
Water Resource 
Water Footprint 1 
(106 m³/year) 
Water Availability 2 
(106 m³/year) 
Water Scarcity 1 
(−) 
Water Scarcity 
Level 
Total (surface and groundwater) 449 650 0.69 Severe 
Groundwater 533 277 1.92 Overexploited 
Notes: 1 Calculated in this study; 2 Surface water availability from [6]; Groundwater availability from [2,6,23,30,42]. 
3.3. Water Pollution Level: Actual versus Maximum Sustainable Gray Water Footprint 
Although the gray WFs of the various sectors as calculated relate to different forms of pollution (the 
gray WFs of the industrial and domestic sectors relate to the aggregate of pollutants, while the gray 
WF of crop production relates to nitrate–nitrogen only), we find it appropriate, as a rough estimate, to 
compare the total gray WF in Jordan with actual runoff. The latter is calculated as the total blue water 
availability in Jordan minus the total blue WF in Jordan, thus representing runoff after depletion by 
human consumption. This is the volume of water that is available to dilute pollutants and is termed 
“waste assimilation capacity” [37]. The water pollution level, the ratio of the actual to the maximum 
sustainable gray WF, is found to be 1.13 (Table 4). This indicates that the gray WF in Jordan exceeds 
waste assimilation capacity, meaning that ambient water quality standards are violated, which confirms 
the widely-voiced pollution of Jordan’s water resources [1,2,4,6,17,29–31]. 
Table 4. Water pollution level in Jordan. 
Water Footprint and Pollution Level Value 
Total gray water footprint 227 × 106 m³/year 
Maximum sustainable gray water footprint 201 × 106 m³/year 
Water pollution level 1.13 
4. Jordan’s Dependency on Foreign Water Resources 
With respect to trans-boundary water resources, total treaty allocations to Jordan (from the Jordan 
and Yarmouk rivers and various springs) around the year 2000 sum up to 220 × 106 m³/year [6]. 
Comparing this with renewable blue water availability in Jordan around that time (650 × 106 m³/year), 
we find that the ratio of external to total water resources of Jordan is 34%. In other words, Jordan is 
dependent on upstream and neighboring countries for one-third of its annual renewable water resources. 
Jordan’s virtual water import dependency is even larger. Of all the water consumption associated 
with the production of the products and commodities Jordanians consume, 86% takes place outside 
Jordan’s borders and is spread all over the world (Figure 3). The total WF of Jordan’s consumption in 
the period 1996–2005 is estimated at 8316 × 106 m³/year, of which 6712 × 106 m³/year is virtual water 
import (Table 5). With virtual water import being more than six times larger than virtual water export 
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(Table 2), Jordan is a large net virtual water importer. Jordan obtained a national water savings of  
7113 × 106 m³/year through trade in the period 1996–2005. This is the volume of water that would 
have been required had Jordan produced all imported commodities itself. 
 
Figure 3. The global water footprint of Jordan’s consumption (a) and an enlarged view of 
the Middle East (b). Both follow the legend depicted in (b). Period: 1996–2005. Data 
based on [8]. 
The largest volumes of imported virtual water in the study period are associated with import of: 
wheat from the USA; barley from Syria and Iraq; maize, soybeans, and wheat from Argentina; animal 
products and soybeans from India; oil palm from Malaysia and Indonesia; and cotton from China (Table 6). 
However, it should be noted that the import pattern has changed since then. Data from FAO [47] 
shows that since 2004/2005 barley imports from Syria and Iraq have ceased and instead have mainly 
come from Ukraine, Germany, Russia, and, more recently, Romania. Also since 2004/2005, Jordan 
mainly imports wheat from Russia, Ukraine, and Syria, with only relatively small amounts from USA 
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and practically zero from Argentina [47]. Nevertheless, Jordan’s dependency on virtual water imports 
remains evident. 
Table 5. Jordan’s virtual water import (VWI) by major product (106 m³/year). Period:  
1996–2005. Data based on [8]. 
Product Green VWI Blue VWI Gray VWI Total VWI % of total 
Barley 1067 217 155 1439 21% 
Wheat 937 63 102 1102 16% 
Animal products 524 66 17 607 9% 
Oil palm fruit 524 0 28 551 8% 
Cotton 221 169 107 497 7% 
Soybeans 454 14 9 477 7% 
Maize 367 20 57 444 7% 
Sugar cane 212 70 17 300 4% 
Other crops 626 259 67 952 14% 
Industrial products 0 23 319 342 5% 
Total import 4933 902 878 6712 100% 
Table 6. Jordan’s virtual water import (VWI) per major trade partner (106 m³/year). 
Period: 1996–2005. Data based on [8]. 
Country 
Green 
VWI 
Blue 
VWI 
Gray 
VWI 
Total 
VWI 
Major Products 
USA 697 88 123 908 Wheat–66%, maize–16%, rice–8% 
Syria 626 92 122 840 Barley–78%, animal products–4% 
Argentina 641 11 31 683 Wheat–25%, maize–38%, soybean–35% 
India 434 35 29 498 
Animal products–40%, soybean–34%, coffee–7%,  
wheat–6%, cotton–4% 
Iraq 172 222 156 550 Barley–69%, industrial products–29% 
Malaysia 319 0.5 14 333 Oil palm–97% 
Indonesia 238 0.1 17 255 Oil palm–88% 
China 133 22 83 239 
Cotton–71%, industrial products–14%, animal 
products–6% 
Turkey 172 21 25 218 Wheat–41%, barley–29%, cheakpeas–13%, cotton–7% 
Ukraine 173 4 30 208 
Barley–60%, sunflower seed–16%,  
industrial products–14%, wheat–9%, 
Australia 93 41 3 138 Animal products–53%, rice–32%, barley–12% 
The largest component in the total WF of the average Jordanian consumer relates to the 
consumption of animal products such as meat, hides and skins, and milk (Figure 4). This WF is largely 
located outside Jordan. For example, imports of animal products associated with large WFs came from 
India and Australia. Higher standards of living in Jordan [48] are likely associated with an increased 
share of animal products in the average diet and hence an increased WF of consumption. 
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Figure 4. The average water footprint of a consumer in Jordan. Period: 1996–2005. Data based on [8]. 
5. Options to Respond to Jordan’s Domestic Water Problems and External Water Dependency 
We review various solutions that have been discussed in the past to greater or lesser extent to 
address Jordan’s domestic water problems and external water dependency. We categorize the various 
response options into five categories, which are subsequently addressed in the following sections:  
(1) increasing water availability; (2) reducing water demand per unit of product; (3) reducing water 
demand by changing production and consumption patterns; (4) reducing risks related to the external 
water dependency; and (5) international assistance in taking in refugees. Lastly, we reflect upon the 
position of current water policy in Jordan with respect to the first three categories. 
5.1. Increasing Water Availability 
5.1.1. Dams for Inter-Seasonal Water Storage 
Between 1950 and 2008, 28 dams were built in Jordan, with a total storage capacity of  
368 × 106 m³ [32]. The newest and largest is the Al-Wehdah Dam on the Yarmouk River with a 
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storage capacity of 110 × 106 m³ [42], although it only received 41 × 106 m³ from 2006 to 2010 and its 
utility is reduced due to water quality issues [49]. Constructing more dams does not seem to be the way 
to increased water availability and reduced water scarcity in Jordan. A lot of water is lost by 
evaporation from surface water reservoirs [40,50], especially in arid regions such as Jordan. There 
comes a point where inter-seasonal storage and release of water during low flow conditions no longer 
outweighs the water loss by evaporation [51]. 
5.1.2. Disi Water Conveyance Project 
The recently realized Disi Water Conveyance Project [52], supplies the greater Amman region from 
the fossil Disi aquifer, mainly to prevent public water supply shortages [1,6,53]. This is, however, a 
short-term, unsustainable solution. The annually abstracted volume from the Disi aquifer is about  
100 × 106 m³/year [54,55], which can be regarded as a blue fossil ground-WF since there is no return 
flow from this abstracted volume to the aquifer. It has been estimated that the Disi aquifer can be 
exploited at a rate of 125 × 106 m³/year for 50 years [2,56]. This means that if current abstraction rates 
continue in the future, the Disi aquifer will be significantly depleted about 50 years from now. The 
already visible consequences of mining the Disi aquifer in the past are discussed by Salameh et al. [55]. 
In addition, the Disi Water Conveyance Project has a big energy footprint due to the distance and 
altitude difference that need to be bridged [15]. Furthermore, the quality of the Disi water has been 
under discussion, since it has been shown that the Disi aquifer contains high amounts of radioactive 
isotopes [57]. It would be wise to cap the fossil ground-WF in Jordan to zero and use the water from 
non-renewable resources only when it is urgently needed, in low amounts and at low frequencies. 
5.1.3. Desalination 
According to several authors [2,4,6,55], the most promising long-term solution to the water 
problems in Jordan is desalination. The main project regarding desalination is the Red Sea-Dead Sea 
Canal project. Early in 2015, Jordan and Israel signed a “green-light” agreement for this project [58]. 
Jordan’s national water strategy projects for 2022 an additional amount of 510 × 106 m³/year desalted 
water compared to 2007, mainly to be realized by the Red Sea-Dead Sea Canal project [23]. Besides 
desalination, a major goal of the project is to restore the water level of the Dead Sea to around 400 
meters below sea level with imported water from the Red Sea [59]. The Red Sea-Dead Sea Canal 
project, which also aims to supply Israel and Palestine, should also bring increased political stability to 
the region by improved regional water security [59]. According to estimates by Al-Omari et al. [60,61], 
the additional freshwater supply from the Red Sea-Dead Sea Canal could reduce the domestic and 
irrigation water deficit in the Jordan Valley down to zero, even under increased water demand and 
reduced water availability in their climate change scenario. 
Increasing Jordan’s water availability by desalination of salt or brackish water seems like an 
attractive option, especially to ensure public water supply. However, this is under the provision that the 
required energy for the very energy-intensive process of desalination is driven by sustainable solar 
and/or wind power. The Red Sea-Dead Sea Canal requires additional energy for intake of the water 
from the Gulf of Aqaba and transport through the canal and to the public water supply stations. Part of 
the energy is generated in the project itself by hydro turbines driven by the large elevation differences, 
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but a significant energy demand remains [59]. Meeting this demand with fossil energy is of course not 
sustainable. Moreover, it would also make Jordan increasingly dependent on foreign energy resources, 
since Jordan is poor in oil and gas [62]. The most recent data, for 2011, show that Jordan already 
imports 96% of the energy it uses [35]. Jordan’s energy dependency is thus even larger than its 
dependency on foreign water resources (86%; see Section 4). 
5.1.4. Water Harvesting and Productive Use of Precipitation 
Various options have been proposed to make better use of the precipitation that falls over Jordan: 
(a) building micro-dams along major water courses to store flood water during winter [2,6];  
(b) improved soil management to increase soil moisture storage in rain-fed agriculture (leading to less 
unproductive evaporation and higher yields) [6]; (c) productively using the limited rainfall over desert 
areas by growing more drought-tolerant crops [15]; and (d) rainwater harvesting in urban areas for 
domestic purposes that do not require drinking water quality [6,17,63]. Regarding the latter, Abdulla 
and Al-Shareef [63] estimate that a maximum of 15.5 × 106 m³/year of rainwater can be harvested from 
the roofs of Jordanian residential buildings, that is, if all rain on all surfaces is collected. For drinking 
purposes, this water would require proper treatment [63]. All these options seem worthwhile for 
investigating and implementing. Most likely, they would be able to reduce the frequency and size of 
domestic and agricultural water shortages, when supply temporarily falls short of demand, e.g., in 
weeks in which the potable water supply through the official network is cut, stored urban rainwater 
from the previous week can partially alleviate the shortage for some household purposes. Regarding 
agriculture, one could think of a short-term dry spell experienced at a particular site—which normally 
severely limits crop yields—but which the crop can survive through better soil management, because 
previous precipitation events sufficiently recharged the soil moisture. However, their potential seems 
insufficient to significantly alleviate water scarcity in Jordan, which is characterized by an imbalance 
between water availability and demand on a larger spatial and temporal scale [27]. 
5.1.5. Treatment and Reuse of Wastewater 
An important track followed by Jordan is the treatment and reuse of wastewater, mainly in 
agriculture [23,48]. The percentage of total generated wastewater in Jordan that was actually reused 
increased from 30% to 38% in the period 2004–2007 [64]. Treated domestic and industrial wastewater 
supplies 12% of Jordan’s irrigation water [65] and the effect of that on soils and crops remains a topic 
of study [66]. Potential future uses of treated wastewater are groundwater recharge and industrial 
cooling [48]. 
Obviously, implementation of proper wastewater treatment will improve the water quality of 
Jordan’s surface and groundwater resources. However, reuse of treated wastewater is not always 
possible and is limited by the presence of certain substances [65]. It is also a challenge to overcome 
negative perceptions towards the reuse of treated wastewater, some of which may be due to cultural 
and religious concerns [67,68]. Furthermore, one should avoid the pitfall of viewing wastewater as a 
new freshwater source that comes in addition to other water sources such as ground- and surface water 
and desalinated water [37]. Wastewater originates from one of those other sources, so one cannot 
increase water availability through reuse. 
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5.2. Reducing Water Demand per Unit of Product 
5.2.1. Rationalization of Irrigation Water Use 
Irrigated agriculture has the largest blue WF in Jordan (Table 1). In theory, irrigation water use can 
be reduced by increasing the price of irrigation water [3,69–71], introducing improved irrigation 
systems [6,72–74], and training farmers in irrigation practices [29,69]. Furthermore, reinforcing 
private ownership of wells may be an option, since well owners have been shown to use irrigation 
water and groundwater resources in a more sustainable way than well leasers [69]. 
In practice, the effectiveness of these options is limited, though. Molle et al. [72] argue that the 
scope for pricing mechanisms to improve irrigation and economic efficiency in the Jordan Valley is 
limited. Substantial water price increases are expected to have an effect, but then farmers should be 
offered alternatives (e.g., less water-intensive crops or the chance to exit agriculture) and positive 
incentives that lower capital and risk constraints for farmers should be co-implemented [72]. 
According to Van Aken et al. [3], improving irrigation efficiencies will merely reduce return flows 
(resulting from over-applied water) to the underlying aquifers and hence do not lead to actual water 
savings from a catchment point of view. Furthermore, since a great deal of the irrigation area in Jordan 
has already been converted to advanced irrigation systems supplied from a pressurized pipe  
network [21,72,74,75], the remaining potential for increasing irrigation efficiency is probably limited. 
However, there is room for water savings by better design and maintenance of the drip irrigation 
systems and better irrigation scheduling [72,74]. 
5.2.2. Reduce Green and Blue Water Footprints of Crops: Benchmarks 
Introducing crop-specific benchmarks is a way to make sure that the green and blue water 
consumption to produce a ton of a certain crop in Jordan remains below reasonable levels [76,77]. 
These benchmarks can, for example, be developed by looking at the best X% performing farmers in 
Jordan regarding WFs, or in neighboring countries with comparable climate and soil conditions. This 
can set a target for other farmers, who can reduce their water consumption per unit of crop by adopting 
advanced irrigation techniques with smart and efficient irrigation scheduling and improving soil and 
crop management (affecting both green and blue water use), all to avoid unproductive evaporation and 
increase yields. The challenge will be to provide sufficient stimuli and capital for farmers to achieve 
the benchmarks (or penalties for not achieving them). 
Although crop production has the largest WF and hence reduction of the WF per unit of crop will 
have the largest overall effect on reducing the WF in Jordan, benchmarks can also be developed for 
other water-consuming sectors in Jordan, for example the large animal industry. It should be noted, 
however, that with options to reduce the water demand per unit of product, the rebound effect lures. 
This refers to the situation in which the saved water is used for extra production, thus (partially) 
offsetting the environmental gains of the efficiency improvement [76]. 
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5.2.3. Reduce Gray Water Footprints: Prevent and Treat 
To reduce gray WFs, water pollution should in the first place be prevented as much as possible and 
unavoidable waste streams should be properly treated. Educating farmers in the use of fertilizers could 
reduce agricultural pollution caused by over- and misuse of fertilizers. Also here, benchmarks could 
serve as a target for industries and farmers to minimize their gray WFs. By properly treating 
unavoidable wastewater streams, much of the current pressure that pollution puts on blue water 
resources can be relieved. Therefore, Jordan should further invest in wastewater treatment plants. 
5.2.4. Rehabilitation of Public Water Supply Network 
Water savings are expected by rehabilitation of the potable water distribution network and 
subsequent proper maintenance of these systems, especially in the capital, Amman [1,3,14,53,73]. 
Currently, much water is lost in these networks by leakages (30%–50% [3]). However, from a 
catchment perspective this water that leaks from underground pipes is not considered a loss, because it 
will probably return to the groundwater and surface water rather than evaporate. In other words, this 
option will help in reducing public water supply shortages, but does not reduce water scarcity in Jordan 
from an environmental point of view. 
5.3. Reducing Water Demand by Changing Production and Consumption Patterns 
5.3.1. Maximum Sustainable Water Footprints: Caps and Permits 
To prevent resource overconsumption, a WF cap that equals the maximum sustainable WF in a river 
basin or aquifer and a system of WF permits could be established [76,78]. This is especially urgent for 
Jordan’s groundwater resources. We have estimated that the ground-WF in Jordan is nearly double the 
groundwater availability (Section 3.2). All sectors in Jordan heavily rely on groundwater (Table 1; [4]). 
To prevent this vital resource from drying up, Jordan should protect its groundwater from 
overexploitation by making sure that the ground-WFs remain below maximum sustainable levels.  
For each aquifer, the Ministry of Water and Irrigation and the Water Authority of Jordan could issue 
ground-WF permits among the water consumers. The sum of these permits shall not exceed the 
groundwater availability for each aquifer, defined as the groundwater recharge minus the fraction of 
natural groundwater outflow required to sustain environmental flow requirements in the river fed by 
the aquifer [37]. It would be wise to formally establish the groundwater availability of each aquifer as 
a ground-WF cap, which represents the maximum sustainable ground-WF for the aquifer. Ideally, such 
ground-WF caps are reconsidered on a yearly basis [77], to account for the high inter-annual 
variability in rainfall and groundwater recharge in Jordan. 
Although in the past efforts have been made to limit groundwater abstractions, limits have not been 
respected and too many abstraction permits have been issued [3,29,72]. Clearly, it will be a challenge 
to establish ground-WF caps and proper issuing and enforcement of ground-WF permits while 
managing the social and economic consequences of reducing groundwater consumption.  
Promising additional policies include regulations on the number of new wells being drilled [4] and 
selective closure of wells by restricted permitting and buyouts [29]. Moreover, increases in the  
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price of energy (electricity and fuels) could give farmers an incentive to reduce groundwater  
(over)pumping [1]. 
A cap on the surface WF in the Jordan River Basin and its sub-catchments would also benefit the 
environment by (partially) restoring historical runoff and flow into the Dead Sea. However, because 
the basin is shared by five countries in a politically tense region, this remains fairly far-fetched for the 
near future. Nevertheless, when first focusing on capping ground-WFs, one should be aware of, and try 
to manage, the risk of increased surface-WFs as a result. The opposite happened when surface water 
diversions were capped in the Murray-Darling river basin [77]. 
5.3.2. Produce High Value-Added Products and Crops: Allocation Efficiency 
Maximum sustainable WFs dictate how much water can be used in total (in a specific basin or 
aquifer). Optimal use of the sustainably available water can be achieved by changes in the production 
pattern. It has been voiced that Jordan should promote a shift from water-intensive low value added 
crops to less water-intensive and high value-added crops [1–3,79,80] or completely towards sectors 
other than agriculture [1,2]. 
Wise water allocation in Jordan should focus on meeting the domestic water demand and 
production of high value-added products and crops with relatively low WFs for export. The income 
generated by export can then be used to import water-intensive commodities (mainly agricultural 
products) required by the Jordan population. This will indeed be socially difficult to obtain, although 
Jordan is not so dependent on agriculture as one might think [2], and will make Jordan even more 
dependent on foreign water resources than it already is. However, the latter scenario is practically 
unavoidable for countries poor in natural resources such as Jordan. 
Politics is perhaps the biggest reason that water reallocation between crops and sectors has not been 
successful so far. As elaborately discussed by Van Aken et al. [3] and Zeitoun et al. [81], there are 
influential tribes and political elites who exert powerful opposition against such measures. 
Furthermore, pricing mechanisms do not affect a large part of the farms where water-intensive crops 
are grown, which are owned by absentee owners who are interested in prestige or leisure rather than 
farm returns [3]. 
5.3.3. Change Consumption Patterns 
A further step in water demand management is to influence consumption patterns that ultimately 
drive the demand for water and thus the domestic water scarcity and external water dependency. 
Several authors have noted that programs to educate water users and raise awareness among the public 
could help in reducing water use [2,6,29,32]. Specifically, such campaigns should focus on the WF 
associated with the products Jordanians consume and how changes in their consumption pattern could 
significantly lower the pressure on water resources. This would be far more effective than focusing on 
water conservation techniques in the household, since the WF of an average consumer in Jordan relates 
to only 2% to water consumption in and around the house (Figure 4). On the other hand, nearly half of 
the WF of the average Jordanian consumer is associated with the consumption of animal products  
(of which 22% is meat) and this share is likely to increase due to higher standards of living. Therefore, 
effective campaigns to stimulate reduced meat consumption, such as meat-free days, seem to be the 
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way to a smaller WF in Jordan (and elsewhere). Also product labels, physical or digital, that inform the 
consumer about the WF of a product and the degree of water scarcity in the catchment where it was 
produced and/or provide a simple “yes or no” advice based on certain sustainability criteria [77], 
would raise awareness and ultimately influence consumer choices for the better (i.e., reduced  
environmental impact). 
5.4. Reducing Risks Related to the External Water Dependency 
It has long been recognized that Jordan is strongly water-dependent on other countries, because the 
country is a large net virtual water importer [6,80,82–87]. Externalizing its consumption-related WF is 
an important mechanism for Jordan to reduce water demand within its borders. 
The previously discussed solutions potentially enable sustainable use of Jordan’s domestic water 
resources, accepting that the country remains heavily dependent on external water resources. Jordan is 
by far too poor in water resources to be self-sufficient or even near self-sufficient. Hence, Jordan’s 
already large external water dependency will unavoidably continue in the future. There are two 
important strategies for Jordan to mitigate the associated risks. 
By externalizing its WF Jordan creates additional pressure on foreign water resources.  
Importing virtual water from regions that are under a degree of water scarcity similar to or worse than 
Jordan is not sustainable and carries the risk of unreliable import flows caused by water limitations 
elsewhere (e.g., failure of yields due to drought). Major trade partners of Jordan that have river basins 
facing severe water scarcity during several months of the year are, for example, Australia, China, 
India, Turkey, and the USA [45]. An important strategy for Jordan is therefore to aim at importing  
water-intensive commodities from nations that are not under a high degree of water scarcity, e.g., from 
countries in Northern Europe, South America, Central Africa, or Canada [45,88]. This is a growing 
challenge, since water scarcity is becoming increasingly important, not only blue but also green water 
scarcity [27]. When an increasing number of regions in the world face water limitations to production, 
externalizing water consumption to other, less water-scarce, nations will become more difficult. 
As a second strategy, Jordan can reduce the risk of import dependency by diversifying its imports 
over various trade partners. Looking at Jordan’s external WF in the period 1996–2005 and food 
imports since (see Section 4), we already see a shift in Jordan’s import partners away from Syria and 
Iraq, most probably inevitable due to the unstable situations in these countries. 
Moreover, as noted in the previous section, to be able to maintain a high virtual water import 
dependency economically, Jordan should generate sufficient income to finance imports. Therefore it 
should use its domestic resources to produce high value-added, low water-consuming products for export. 
In contrast to our view, Alqadi and Kumar [4] state that further reliance on virtual water import is 
not the way to go for Jordan and that desalination is the only means to replace current virtual water 
imports. However, it is unthinkable that Jordan domestically produces the majority of the commodities 
it currently imports. Jordan’s national water saving by trade is huge, being in the order of annual 
precipitation over Jordan and more than 10 times larger than renewable blue water resources. In other 
words, even in the hypothetical situation that all rainfall over Jordan would be used productively to 
make the commodities consumed by the people in Jordan, this would barely suffice. To put it 
differently, nearly 14 times the projected volume of desalted water in 2022 (520 × 106 m³/year [23]) 
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would be required to replace the water Jordan saved by virtual water imports, notwithstanding the 
limitations of available arable land in Jordan to becoming more self-sufficient. 
Reduced risk from Jordan’s dependency on trans-boundary rivers and aquifers will need to come 
from international cooperation towards improved regional water security. It shall be clear that this is a 
major challenge considering the history of the region [22], recent conflicts in the region [12,13], and 
biased knowledge production [89]. 
5.5. International Assistance in Taking in Refugees 
Jordan has serious problems with securing its domestic water supply and has to cope with large 
refugee influxes [1,2,5,6,15]. Because Jordan’s water resources are currently insufficient to support the 
already large and rapidly increasing population in a sustainable manner, the international community 
should assist Jordan in taking in refugees. 
Alongside Lebanon, Turkey, Iraq, and Egypt, Jordan is in the top five host countries of Syrian 
refugees, together hosting roughly 95% of Syrian refugees by 2014 [90]. A year later, with the Islamic 
State having taken over large parts of Syria and Iraq and the upheaval of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict 
in the summer of 2014, the number of refugees in Jordan has expanded even more (Figure 2).  
As Jordan and other first-host countries do not have the capacity to cope with the sudden large 
population growth, this could eventually lead to economic and social instability in these countries [91]. 
Financial humanitarian aid is mainly coming from the European Union (EU) [90,92].  
However, only about 4% of all Syrian refugees sought asylum in the EU [93] and they are 
predominantly taken in by Germany and Sweden [90]. Furthermore, the Gulf Cooperation Council 
(GCC) could potentially provide more assistance. According to Amnesty International [90], the 
countries of the GCC (Bahrain, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Oman, Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates) 
have contributed zero resettlement places for Syrian refugees. 
5.6. Positioning Current Water Policy in Jordan 
With respect to the first three response categories discussed above (Sections 5.1–5.3), current water 
policy in Jordan is mainly focused on the first category of response: increasing water availability [4,81]. 
To a lesser extent, policy is directed at reducing water demand per unit of product by improving 
efficiency in irrigation and public water supply networks and treatment and reuse of wastewater. 
Efforts in the category of reducing water demand by changing production and consumption patterns 
concentrate on limiting over-exploitation of water resources. Besides efforts to combat groundwater 
over-abstraction [29], Jordan’s national water strategy [23] includes plans to limit and regulate 
irrigated agriculture. Allocation efficiency is also a topic in the national water strategy, which 
acknowledges that water should be allocated to high value-added purposes with relatively low water 
consumption, while ensuring that domestic water needs are fulfilled [23]. Better water pricing and 
removing import tariffs on agricultural commodities should stimulate this [23]. However, despite the 
attention to these strategies in Jordan’s water strategy, practice shows a focus on meeting demand with 
supply-side measures, while efforts to manage demand face opposition from powerful entities, as 
previously mentioned [81]. 
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Influencing dietary consumption patterns to reduce water demand remains unmentioned in the 
national water strategy [23] and does not seem to be on Jordan’s policy agenda. The document does 
include goals on raising awareness, but these rather focus on informing the public of the water 
problems in Jordan so as to create support for intended regulations to increase water prices and limit 
abstractions and to provide “concrete suggestions on economically cost-efficient measures every 
individual can implement to reduce water demand” [23]. The latter applies to water conservation 
techniques in the household, rather than choices in what to consume. 
6. Conclusions 
We have analyzed Jordan’s domestic water scarcity and pollution and the country’s external water 
dependency and conclude that: 
1. Even while taking into account the return flows, blue water scarcity in Jordan is severe; 
2. Groundwater consumption is nearly double the groundwater availability; 
3. Water pollution aggravates blue water scarcity; 
4. While Jordan’s dependence on trans-boundary resources is already large (34%), its dependency 
on external water resources through trade is much larger, with 86% of the water consumption 
associated with the production of products and commodities consumed by the Jordan 
population taking place in foreign countries all over the world. 
Subsequently, we have reviewed sustainable solutions that reduce the risk of this extreme water 
scarcity and dependency. A strategy for Jordan to mitigate the risks of extreme water scarcity and 
dependency should involve the following ingredients: 
1. Do not tap into fossil groundwater resources; use only in urgent times, in low amounts and at 
low frequencies. 
2. Drive desalination projects with sustainable solar and wind energy. 
3. Investigate and implement options for water harvesting and productive use of rainfall to 
overcome water shortages on the small scale. 
4. Prevent pollution, treat inevitable waste streams, and possibly reuse wastewater flows, but 
consider that treated wastewater is not a new freshwater resource in addition to ground- and 
surface water and desalinated water. 
5. Develop WF benchmarks for crops and products that reflect reasonable levels of water 
consumption per unit of production and work towards achieving those benchmarks by focusing 
on smart and efficient irrigation scheduling and improved soil and crop management. 
6. Cap the WF in each river basin and aquifer to the maximum sustainable WF, focusing on 
groundwater first, while managing the risks of averted impact on surface water. 
7. Increase allocation efficiency by making sure domestic water demand is met and using the 
remaining available water below the maximum sustainable level for the production of high 
value-added products and crops with relatively low WFs for export. 
8. Use the revenue obtained by export to finance the inevitable imports of water-intensive 
products and commodities from a diverse number of countries that are under a significantly 
lower degree of water scarcity than Jordan. 
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9. Stimulate a change towards consumption patterns with a lower WF, e.g., by means of 
introducing meat-free days and product labeling. 
10 The international community should assist Jordan in taking in the large numbers of refugees 
from neighboring conflict regions, to reduce the domestic water demand. 
With respect to these ingredients, Jordan’s current water policy requires a strong redirection 
towards water demand management. Actual implementation of the plans in the national water strategy 
(against existing opposition) would be a first step. However, more attention should be paid to reducing 
water demand by changing the consumption patterns of Jordanian consumers. Moreover, unsustainable 
exploitation of the fossil Disi aquifer should soon be halted and planned desalination projects require 
careful consideration on the sustainability of their energy supply. 
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